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111 Woodcrest Road
Woodcrest Corporate Center, Suite 200
Cherry Hill, NJ 08003-0000
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Brion W. Kelley, Esquire (Argued)
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Kingston, PA 18704
Counsel for Appellee
________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
We have the once-unusual case of a mortgage
foreclosure brought in federal court based on diversity
jurisdiction. The District Court granted a default judgment in
favor of Plaintiff-Appellant National City Mortgage
(“NCM”), and ordered that the property securing NCM’s loan
to the defendants, homeowners Brian and Elaine Stephen, be
sold at a foreclosure sale. Following that sale, the Court
granted NCM’s motion to set aside the sale after NCM had
failed to notify The Chase Manhattan Bank as Indenture
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Trustee (“Chase”), a junior lien holder, of the impending sale,
a notice required by state law. However, when Chase moved
to vacate the set-aside order, the Court granted that motion,
reasoning that the notice issue involved an independent
question of state law and was not properly before it. We
vacate and remand.
I.

Background

In May 2000, NCM loaned the Stephens $143,460
secured by a mortgage on the Stephens’ residential property.
About one year later, Chase, c/o Residential Funding
Corporation (“RFC”),1 recorded a second mortgage on the
property with the Monroe County, Pennsylvania, Recorder of
Deeds, securing the principal sum of $51,000.
We fast forward to November 2007 when, following
the Stephens’ default on the NCM loan, NCM brought a
foreclosure action in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania based on diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).2

1

RFC was the then-servicer of the mortgage loan.

2

Even prior to the financial crisis of 2008, mortgage
foreclosures in federal courts were not unheard of. See, e.g.,
Land Holdings (St. Thomas) Ltd. v. Mega Holdings, Inc., 283
F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2002); Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v.
Smith, 155 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Foreclosure
Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Ryder v. Wash.
Mut. Bank, 501 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Conn. 2007); Mellon
Bank v. Pasqualis-Politi, 800 F. Supp. 1297 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
Today they are much more common due to congested state
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Two months later, the District Court entered a final
order of default judgment in the amount of $146,501.96 and
ordered the property sold by marshal’s sale to effect the
judgment. NCM inadvertently failed to give notice to Chase.
In March 2008, RFC, now known as GMAC-Rescap,
assigned the servicing of the Chase loan to Dreambuilder
Investments, LLC (“Dreambuilder”).3 No substitution of the
servicer, nor its new address, was recorded with the Monroe
County Recorder of Deeds. In May 2008, NCM was the
successful bidder at the foreclosure sale of the Stephens’
property.4
NCM had a problem, however. Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 3129.1 calls for the foreclosing plaintiff prior
to the foreclosure sale of mortgaged real property to give
notice of the sale to, among others, junior lien holders. As it
had not given notice to Chase of the foreclosure sale, Chase
court dockets. Indeed, counsel for NCM informed us at oral
argument that NCM brought the foreclosure in federal court
because sheriff’s sales in Monroe County were backlogged by
approximately 18 months, whereas federal marshal’s sales
were typically held within four months of obtaining a
foreclosure judgment.
3

Except where the context requires otherwise, we refer
hereafter simply to Chase and not to any entity servicing its
mortgage loan to the Stephens.
4

In foreclosure parlance, it “bid in” the property. In this case,
it bid the minimum—the sale costs—thus not bidding an
amount that offset a portion of the amount owed to it as
reflected in the judgment.

4

retained its lien on the property. Cf. RTC Mortg. Trust 1994N-2 v. Fry, 730 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1999) (setting aside divestiture
of junior mortgage lien because notice to that lienholder was
insufficient). Thus, rather than the typical outcome of NCM
purchasing the property free of liens, its ownership would be
subject to Chase’s lien. So, on June 13, 2008, NCM, in a
display of chutzpah to cover its own omission, brought a
Motion to Divest Lien asking the District Court to divest
Chase of its lien. The Court dismissed the Motion, stating that
it had closed the case after granting NCM the foreclosure
remedy it sought and that NCM’s attempt to “have the court
determine its rights vis-a-vis another party claiming an
interest in the property . . . [concerned] an independent
question of state law and [was] not properly before the court.”
Willing to be more practical, NCM next brought a
motion to set aside the marshal’s sale, arguing that this would
allow it to give notice to Chase of the new sale (thus giving
Chase the chance to bid at that sale if it desired), and permit
NCM to “realize from the land the full amount of its
judgment and the purpose of the foreclosure action.” The
Court granted NCM’s motion to set aside without writing an
opinion.
The story does not end there, however. Chase—
through RFC and “its assignee Dreambuilder”—then moved
to vacate the set-aside order, and the Court granted that
motion.5 In doing so, it characterized NCM’s set-aside
5

NCM argues to us that because the assignment of the
servicing of the loan to Dreambuilder was never recorded, the
latter is not the lien holder of record, and therefore lacked
standing to bring a motion to vacate. As a fall back to its
lack-of-standing argument, NCM makes two intervention
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motion as “another attempt to address problems with the title
created by the plaintiff’s actions in prosecuting the case,” and
noted that these were issues of state law in which “a federal
court has no interest.” It noted that it had closed the case
after providing NCM the remedy it sought, and restated that
determining another party’s rights vis-à-vis the property “is
an independent question of state law and not properly before
the court.”

claims: (1) the District Court erred in failing to make Chase
or Chase c/o Dreambuilder seek to intervene in the
foreclosure action, as they were non-parties; and (2) even had
either entity sought to intervene, that effort would have failed
because neither was a party-in-interest under Pennsylvania
law with a recorded interest in the foreclosed property.
We disagree on all fronts. Chase is the party in
interest regardless which loan servicer—RFC or
Dreambuilder—handled matters as Chase’s servicing agent.
Moreover, NCM brought its Motion to Divest Lien against
“Chase Manhattan Bank as Indenture Trustee c/o Residential
Funding Corp.” and “Chase Manhattan Bank as Indenture
Trustee c/o Dreambuilder Investments, LLC.” Chase in
either form of identification was the clearly intended
beneficiary of the District Court’s order in its favor
dismissing NCM’s motion. See Washington Hosp. v. White,
889 F.2d 1294, 1299 (3d Cir. 1989) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 71 gives
standing to non-party to enforce court order in its favor in the
same manner as a party).

6

Following the District Court’s denial of NCM’s
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion for
reconsideration, NCM appealed to us.6
II.

Discussion

A.
Abstention doctrines do not support the
District Court’s ruling
The District Court did not explicitly state that it was
refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over NCM’s motion to set
aside the marshal’s sale, but in vacating its set-aside order
without ruling on the merits and reasoning that the issue
concerned “an independent question of state law” not
properly before it, the Court effectively abstained from
exercising its jurisdiction. This put NCM out of court. See
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713 (1996)
(abstention by district court “puts litigants effectively out of
court” (quotation marks omitted)). “We employ a two-step
process when reviewing a district court’s decision to abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction,” reviewing the underlying
legal questions de novo but the court’s decision to abstain for
abuse of discretion. Matusow v. Trans-Cnty. Title Agency,
545 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Chiropractic Am.
v. Lavecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1999)).
6

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
While the appeal was pending before us, NCM filed a petition
for equitable relief in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe
County asking that Court to determine the interests of Chase,
RFC, and Dreambuilder in the property. The parties inform
us that the state court proceedings are on hold pending the
outcome of this appeal.
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Although foreclosure actions are more common in
state court, the District Court had diversity jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of different
States . . . .”). The homeowner defendants, the Stephens,
resided in Pennsylvania. NCM’s principal place of business
is Ohio. The amount in controversy was over $140,000.
While the able District Court focused on the fact that the
notice issue before it involved state law, that is not
dispositive. A district court with a case under its diversity
jurisdiction almost always decides questions of state law, as it
applies the substantive law of the state where the district court
is located. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 228
(3d Cir. 2005). The question, rather, is whether the District
Court’s jurisdiction here extends to resolving issues that arise
from an error committed during the pendency of its
jurisdiction over a marshal’s sale that it ordered. We
conclude that it does.
A federal court has a “virtually unflagging obligation”
to exercise its jurisdiction. Matusow, 545 F.3d at 248
(quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))). It may abstain from
exercising jurisdiction only when the “clearest of
justifications . . . warrant[s] [it].” Colorado River, 424 U.S.
at 819. Put another way, abstention is “an extraordinary and
narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate
a controversy properly before it,” and may be used “only in
the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties
to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important

8

countervailing interest,” and not “merely because a State
court could entertain it.” Id. at 813 (quotation marks
omitted); see also Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George V.
Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 2009) (same).
Typical comity-based grounds for abstention are the
following:
Pullman abstention, an outgrowth of Railroad
Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941), which is proper when a state court
determination of a question of state law might
moot or change a federal constitutional issue
presented in a federal court case; Burford
abstention, an outgrowth of Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), which is proper when
questions of state law in which the state has
expressed a desire to establish a coherent policy
with respect to a matter of substantial public
concern are presented; and Younger abstention,
an outgrowth of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), which is proper when federal
jurisdiction has been invoked for the purpose of
restraining certain state proceedings.
Trent v. Dial Med., Inc., 33 F.3d 217, 223 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994),
superseded by statute on other grounds (citing Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 814-16). The first and third exceptions do
not apply here. There are no constitutional issues, and federal
jurisdiction has not been invoked to halt state proceedings.
Burford abstention comes into play only when there
are “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy
problems of substantial public import whose importance
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transcends the result in the case then at bar,” or where “the
exercise of federal review of the question . . . would be
disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with
respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 814. For example, in Burford federal
abstention was appropriate where Texas had established an
“elaborate review system for dealing with the geological
complexities of oil and gas fields,” and where federal review
would “have had an impermissibly disruptive effect on state
policy for the management of those fields.” Id. at 815.
The District Court here was asked to apply
Pennsylvania law on the equitable question of whether to set
aside a foreclosure sale because of a mistake made during
foreclosure proceedings. See Kaib v. Smith, 684 A.2d 630,
631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (decision to set aside a sheriff’s sale
is an equitable one and “addressed to the sound discretion of
the hearing court”). “The trial court’s ultimate disposition of
the [set aside of a sheriff’s sale] will not be disturbed upon
review absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.” M & T
Mortg. Corp. v. Keesler, 826 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003).
No overriding state policy or matter of substantial
public concern is implicated in this case. Indeed, there are no
“difficult questions of state law” whereby a federal court will
make state policy, and deciding the state claims will not
“impair efforts to implement state policy.” Colorado River,
424 U.S. at 814-15. In this context, the Burford exception is
not in play. See id. at 815.
In addition to the three abstention doctrines just
discussed, Colorado River abstention covers the circumstance
where the presence of concurrent state proceedings may
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indicate that a district court should abstain from the
“contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdiction[]” due
to principles of “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard
to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive
disposition of litigation.” Dial Med., 33 F.3d at 223 (quoting
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817). This abstention is even
more rare than “the three traditional categories,” because,
among other things, the pendency of proceedings in state
court does not normally bar litigation in federal court of the
same issues. Id. In Colorado River, the United States sought
a declaration of its water rights in the context of Colorado’s
water management scheme. 424 U.S. at 805-06. The
Supreme Court reasoned that, although typical abstention
doctrines would not support dismissal by the District Court,
other factors bearing on “wise judicial administration”
weighed against concurrent proceedings in federal court, and
thus dismissal there was warranted. Id. at 817, 819-20.
These factors were:
the congressional policy expressed by the
McCarran Amendment7 and . . . (a) the apparent
absence of any proceedings in the District
Court, other than the filing of the complaint,
prior to the motion to dismiss, (b) the extensive
involvement of state water rights occasioned by
this suit naming 1,000 defendants, (c) the 3007

The McCarran Amendment (also known as the McCarran
Water Rights Suit Act) provides, inter alia, for the joinder of
the United States as a defendant in any suit “for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or
other source.” 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
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mile distance between the District Court in
Denver and the court in Division 7 [the state
water division in question], and (d) the existing
participation by the Government in Division 4,
5, and 6 proceedings.
Id. at 820. Noting the District Court’s “heavy obligation to
exercise jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court stated that it was
not deciding whether “dismissal would be warranted if more
extensive proceedings had occurred in the District Court prior
to dismissal.” Id.
In applying these factors to our case, we note that the
controversy has taken place almost exclusively in federal
court, the state proceeding began after NCM appealed to us
and has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal, and
there are none of the complicating factors present in Colorado
River. Thus, Colorado River abstention does not apply either.
B.

The District Court had ancillary jurisdiction

The District Court vacated its order setting aside the
sale, reasoning as follows:
[The motion to set aside the sale] appears
merely to be another attempt to address
problems with the title created by the plaintiff’s
actions in prosecuting this case. Such problems
with title are an issue of state law, and a federal
court has no interest in such issues. As the
court previously informed the plaintiff, this case
concerns a mortgage foreclosure. Plaintiff
obtained the remedy it sought in this case—
foreclosure of the mortgage on the property.
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The court closed the case after providing that
remedy. Plaintiff then purchased that property
in a marshal’s sale. Plaintiff now seeks to have
the court determine its rights vis-a-vis another
party claiming an interest in the property. That
question is an independent question of state law
and not properly before the court.
Despite closing the case after providing NCM with the
foreclosure sale it sought and before NCM brought its first
motion, the District Court’s ancillary jurisdiction extended
until the completion of the marshal’s sale process it ordered
to effect the judgment it had granted NCM. As NCM’s error
giving rise to the dispute took place before the sale process
was completed, the Court had jurisdiction over the ensuing
controversy.
“Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is . . . a creature of
necessity,” Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 359 (1996),
giving federal courts the power to enforce their judgments
and ensuring that they are not dependent on state courts to
enforce their decrees. IFC Interconsult, AG v. Safeguard Int’l
Partners, LLC, 438 F.3d 298, 313 (3d Cir. 2006). Ancillary
jurisdiction is a common law doctrine that survived the
codification of supplemental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Robb Evans & Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363
(4th Cir. 2010) (“§ 1367 governs ancillary jurisdiction over
claims asserted in a case over which the district court has
federal subject matter jurisdiction . . . [but] does not affect
common law ancillary jurisdiction over related proceedings”)
(emphases in original) (quotation marks omitted); see
generally Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354-56 (discussing the
availability of ancillary jurisdiction after § 1367 was enacted
but declining to extend it based on the facts of that case);
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Kokkonen v. Guardian Life. Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 379-82
(1994) (same). “[A] district court acquires jurisdiction over a
case or controversy in its entirety and, as an incident to the
disposition of a dispute that is properly before it, may
exercise jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case
over which it would not have jurisdiction were they
independently presented.” Sandlin v. Corp. Interiors, Inc.,
972 F.2d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting 6 Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1444, at 31617 (2d ed. 1990)). In other words, a court may exercise
jurisdiction over related matters arising out of the case in
which it has initial jurisdiction. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d at 363
n.2. Here, the dispute over NCM’s alleged errors in sending
notice of the marshal’s sale to interested parties is a matter we
can easily say is not only related, but closely related, to the
Court’s order of the sale. We thus have no doubt it had
jurisdiction over the dispute.
Chase is incorrect that the District Court cannot decide
this controversy because its ancillary jurisdiction ended when
the mortgage foreclosure judgment was entered in favor of
NCM. The controversy arose while the District Court had
jurisdiction over the marshal’s sale, which it had ordered to
give effect to the foreclosure remedy it granted NCM.
Chase cites to the doctrine that once a judgment is
entered in an action, a court needs separate jurisdictional
grounds to hear factually intertwined issues. See Kokkonen,
511 U.S. at 380-82 (declining to extend ancillary jurisdiction
to an action to enforce terms of a settlement agreement
because retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement
was not in court’s order and breach of a separate contract
requires a separate jurisdictional basis); Sawka v. Healtheast,
Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1993) (district court has no
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power to enforce a settlement agreement where it dismissed
the case without retaining jurisdiction). Here, by contrast,
NCM is trying to deal with a flaw in the foreclosure sale
process caused by its failure to give notice.
After
overreaching in its attempt to divest Chase of its lien, NCM
seeks to wipe the foreclosure sale slate clean and redo that
sale correctly. The District Court here specifically ordered
the marshal’s sale of mortgaged property to recover on the
debt due, and it needed to resolve disputes in that process.
In addition, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
3132 provides that a court ordering a foreclosure sale may,
“[u]pon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the
personal property or of the sheriff’s deed to real property, . . .
upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and order a resale
or enter any other order which may be just and proper under
the circumstances.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 3132. According to
counsel for both parties at oral argument as well as an
affidavit from NCM’s counsel, the deed has not been
delivered to NCM.
The consequences of a ruling affirming the District
Court support as well that it is the most appropriate forum to
settle this matter. The remedy NCM seeks is the set-aside of
the foreclosure sale. This remedy cannot be granted in state
court without reversing the District Court’s order approving
the sale and thus abrogating that Court’s disposition of the
case. Cf. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380 (suggesting ancillary
jurisdiction extends to controversies where a federal court’s
disposition of a case may be “flouted or imperiled”).
Moreover, as we surmised and as counsel for Chase
confirmed at oral argument, were we to affirm and the setaside issue later brought before a Pennsylvania state court,
Chase would argue that the state court is powerless to set
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aside a sale ordered by a federal court. Counsel for Chase
conceded it would instead argue that the only remedy
available to NCM would be an action to quiet title. He also
agreed that the question in a quiet title action would be
whether the marshal’s sale divested Chase of its lien because
of NCM’s failure to provide Chase notice. Where state courts
potentially are prevented from granting a remedy otherwise
available to a party, the district court (where the matter
started) is the best place to decide these issues, especially
where the problem arose during a property sale it ordered.
See, e.g., Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819 (rule requiring that
jurisdiction be yielded to the court first acquiring control of
property avoids the generation of additional litigation and
inconsistent dispositions of property).
In an effort to preserve its leverage, Chase argues that
we can affirm the denial of the motion for reconsideration and
the order vacating the set-aside motion because the clear
consequence of failure to give notice to a junior lien holder is
that the junior lien is not discharged by the sale and the
purchaser takes the property subject to the lien. But this does
not address the issue presented here—whether equity calls for
putting aside the sale. See, e.g., First E. Bank, N.A. v.
Campstead, Inc., 637 A.2d 1364, 1367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
(Olszewski, J., concurring) (agreeing that sale should be set
aside upon motion of the party inadequately notified where
proper notice was not given and adding that Pennsylvania
rules of civil procedure should be interpreted “liberally . . . to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding to which they are applicable”)
(quotation marks omitted). Pennsylvania courts sometimes
grant requests to set aside a sale and sometimes do not,
depending on the evidence presented by the parties. Compare
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Gambler v. Huyett, 679 A.2d 831, 834-36 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996) (where parties can be returned to the same positions
they held prior to the sale, court may set aside the sale where
there was a defect in the notice procedure because this cures
any prejudice to the party that did not receive the notice), with
Nat’l Penn Bank v. Shaffer, 672 A.2d 326, 329-330 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996) (sale does not necessarily have to be vacated
if the mistake is the fault of the petitioning party who is a
sophisticated financial lender whose counsel made a mistake
of law and overbid at the sale, erroneously believing the sale
would discharge the senior lender).8 The record here is too
incomplete for us to decide the merits of the motion, and thus
we remand for the District Court to oversee the completion of
that record and to decide whether a “do-over” is called for.
All we decide is that it cannot deny that do-over on, in effect,
abstention grounds. See, e.g., Kelsey-Barber Corp. v.
Campbell, 381 A.2d 938, 943 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
(remanding grant of set-aside petition for further “completion
8

The Court in Shaffer refused to set aside the sale in part
because the parties could not be returned to the position they
held at the time of the sale where the identity of a third party
bidder at the initial sale was unknown, and the Court did not
want to speculate whether this person would bid at a second
sale. Id. The Court also noted that the parties did not contest
the validity of the sale proceedings nor allege “any
deficiencies pertaining to . . . notice.” Id. at 329. Though
Gambler appears to be more pertinent to the facts in our case,
equity calls for full factual findings rather than our
speculation. In any event, the burden is on the proponent of
the set-aside petition to show that the circumstances warrant
relief. GMAC Mortg. Corp. v. Buchanan, 929 A.2d 1164,
1167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
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of the record” where there was an inadequate basis for the
lower court reaching its conclusion).
*

*

*

*

*

What happened here was the filing in federal court of a
foreclosure action that traditionally is handled in state court.
When matters became sticky before the marshal’s sale was
complete under state law, the District Court in effect
abstained from deciding those contested matters. It should
not have done so, for once it had jurisdiction and had acted, it
had the duty not to fall back when unanticipated issues
relating to the foreclosure sale process arose. We thus vacate
and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
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